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LAW AND SPORTS OFFICIATING: A
MISUNDERSTOOD AND JUSTLY
NEGLECfED RELATIONSHIP
Mark A. Graber*
Ronald Dworkin insisted in Taking Rights Seriously that
"[r]ules are applicable in an aU-or-nothing fashion." 1 "This anor-nothing," he continued,
is seen most plainly if we look at the way rules operate, not in
law, but in some enterprise they dominate-a game, for example. In baseball, a rule provides that if the batter has had
three strikes, he is out. An official cannot consistently acknowledge that this is an accurate statement of a baseball
rule~ and decide that a batter who has had three strikes is not
out.

Although other themes of that work received some scholarly attention, Dworkin's attempt to initiate a law and sports officiating
movement fell flat. Interdisciplinary studies were the rage of the
legal academy during the 1980s. Nevertheless, no law professor
publicly maintained that lawyers could learn anything about the
law from reading the collected works of Ron Luciano3 or
watching ESPN. When Dworkin revised his theory of law in
1986, he abandoned athletics altogether for the more ethereal
pastures of law and literary interpretation.4
Dworkin did have one potential disciple during the late
1970s. As a young graduate student paying my way through
school refereeing high school basketball, soccer and softball
* Associate Professor, Government, University of Maryland. Thanks to all mem·
bers of the Georgetown/Maryland Constitutionalism Conference for helpful comments.
I am also grateful for the accommodations at the Wilson Center in Washington, D.C.,
where this essay was finished.
I. Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 24 (Harvard U. Press, 1978).
2. ld.
3. See Ron Luciano and David Fisher, The Fall of the Roman Umpire (Bantam
Books, 1986); Ron Luciano and David Fisher, The Umpire Strikes Back (Bantam Books,
1982).
4. See Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire 45-86 (Harvard U. Press, 1986).
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games, I frequently thought about the relationships between law
and sports officiating. Driving to and from my various officiating assignments, I mentally outlined the seminal article on the
subject. The first part would be a devastating analysis clearly
demonstrating that the great constitutional theorist Ronald
Dworkin knew nothing about sports officiating. Unfortunately,
the second part always proved more difficult. I could never
think of any aspect of refereeing relevant to the study of the law.
The project was soon abandoned.
Several law review essays published during the early 1990s
renewed my interest in law and sports officiating. John Hart Ely
mentioned that he had often "thought about trying to elaborate
the metaphor between constitutional interpretation and jazz improvisation."5 Ely failed to "writ[e] this up" only because "it was
never clear what anyone was supposed to learn from it about either constitutional theory or jazz."6 Unbeknownst to Ely,
Sanford Levinson and Jack Balkin were writing a serious paper
on law and music. Both Levinson and Balkin admitted that they
were not "member[s] of the musicological scholarly community
to which one ordinarily looks for 'authoritative' pronouncements. " 7 Still, they asked readers to consider: "Why would one
believe that one must be an 'expert' in an area in order to have
interesting things to say?" 8 I was inspired by their article to rethink my reluctance to inaugurate a law and sports officiating
movement. If lawyers could learn from musicians, why not
sports officials? Besides, unlike Levinson and Balkin, I might be
regarded as a "suitably certified expert(]"9 in both disciplines I
would be writing about.
My original insight still seems correct. My experiences doing more than one thousand little league, college intramural,
middle school, high school and (rarely) college varsity games will
not teach law professors anything new about the law, or at least
about the legal questions law professors have traditionally asked.
Nevertheless, an analysis of Dworkin's ill-fated foray into
law and sports officiating may cast some light on the problems
5. John Hart Ely, Another Such Victory: Constitutional Theory and Practice in a
World Where Courts Are No Different from Legislatures, 11 Va. L. Rev. 833, 837 n.10
(1991).
6. ld.
7. Sanford Levinson and J.M. Balkin, Law, Music, and Other Performing Arts, 139
U. Pa. L. Rev. 1597, 1602 (1991).
8. ld. at 1602-03.
9. ld.
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that more numerous legal forays into other non-legal fields confront. Law professors writing essays on law and any other subject on which they are not "suitably certified experts" have repeated and will continue to repeat Dworkin's most salient
mistakes. Casual legal interlopers into other disciplines risk
making bald assertions that serious scholars in the non-legal field
recognize as flatly wrong, if not downright silly. Scholarly
mechanisms for identifying error, weak in academic law to begin
with, are particularly weak when law reviews consider the merits
of non-legal scholarly assertions. Casual legal interlopers into
other disciplines also tend to rely uncritically on legal models to
describe non-legal phenomena. Legal writing frequently assumes that debates in other disciplines can be understood in
terms of the categories that best describe legal debates. Relying
exclusively on categories derived from the study of legal phenomena, law professors may miss the most interesting features of
their interdisciplinary subject, features which generate entirely
different models of interpretation, evaluation, and decision
making.
Part I of this essay demonstrates that Dworkin fundamentally misconceives the practice of sports officiating. Games are
rarely as rule-bound as Taking Rights Seriously maintains. Both
youth and major league umpires frequently rely on the sort of
first principles that Dworkin claims should and do characterize
legal decision making. Part II suggests that Dworkin's failings
are rooted in more general problems with interdisciplinary legal
scholarship. To the best of my knowledge, Dworkin did not
practice or study sports officiating before writing Taking Rights
Seriously. Moreover, that work was probably not reviewed by a
"suitably certified expert" in sports officiating. Relying on general intelligence alone, Dworkin failed to recognize that baseball
umpires "interpret" the strike zone and other rules, relying on
the general principle that teams should not gain "unfair advantages." Taking Rights Seriously also never considers seriously
whether, in light of the fundamental differences between judging
and sports officiating, any model of interpretation drawn from
legal experience could well capture how a sports official makes
decisions. Part III briefly documents similar mistakes in interdisciplinary legal works that touch on political science, using as
an example recent writings by Cass Sunstein. Part IV concludes
that while law professors do not have to be "suitably certified
experts" to have "interesting things to say" about non-legal
subjects, interdisciplinary legal scholarship requires more active
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participation by "suitably certified experts." Law professors are
unlikely to do the best interdisciplinary scholarship, but they can
avoid the most egregious of Dworkin's errors.
I. THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPORTS OFFICIATING
The rule that "if the batter has had thr-ee strikes, he is out"
hardly demonstrates that baseball is more rule dominated than
law. The constitution declares that government may not abridge
the freedom of speech or impose cruel and unusual punishments.
To paraphrase Dworkin on games, "A[] [judge] cannot consistently acknowledge that this is an accurate statement of a [constitutional] rule, and decide that [a law abridging the freedom of
speech or imposing cruel and unusual punishments] is [constitutional]."10 Little professional training would be necessary if all
sports officials did was enforce the three-strike and similarly
structured rules. My youngest daughter (age 9) could easily be
trained to cry "yer out" every time a batter had three strikes or,
for that matter, to rule against the government once an abridgment of free speech had been demonstrated. The difficult decision is determining when a pitch is a strike or when a government action has abridged the freedom of speech.
The point Dworkin was trying to make about the distinction
between baseball rules and legal principles would have been
clearer had he used as his example the definition of the strike
zone. "The strike zone," in professional baseball, is defined as
"that area over home plate the upper limit of which is a horizontal line at the midpoint between the top of the shoulders and the
top of the uniform pants, and the lower limit is a line at the hollow beneath the knee cap." 11 So understood, the strike zone
seems to be a rule rather than a principle. The crucial feature of
a rule is that its application consists solely of determining
whether "the facts Jthe] rule stipulates" actually occurred in a
particular instance. 1 Assuming the batter has made no effort to
hit the ball, the home plate umpire calls a pitch a strike if and
only if the ball at some point entered the area set out in the definition of the strike zone. This seems to require only the ability
to get the facts right. Much skill and professional training are
10. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously at 24 (cited in note 1).
11. Official Rules of Major League Baseball34 (Triumph Books, 1997). The provision adds that "[t)he strike zone shall be determined from the batter's stance as the batter is prepared to swing at a pitched ball." ld.
12. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously at 24 (cited in note 1).
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required to determine whether a sharply curving pitch thrown at
over ninety miles an hour tipped the strike zone at some point.
Still, the definition of the strike zone and similar provisions indicate that umpiring decisions are almost always limited to determining whether the facts justify application of a generally agreed
upon standard.
Dworkin recognizes that legal rules play a substantial role in
the law. 13 The argument in Taking Rights Seriously is simply that
while virtually all sports norms take the form of rules, important
legal norms take the form of principles. Unlike the definition of
the strike zone, the First Amendment's declaration that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech"
does not describe in any detail the set of facts that constitute an
abridgement of speech rights. That constitutional norm would
more closely resemble a sports rule if the Bill of Rights declared
that "Congress shall make no law imposing a prior restraint on
speech." The laws of baseball would more resemble constitutional norms if the strike zone was defined as "the area in which
the average professional player ought to be able to hit the average professional pitch."
Rule dominated activities apparently differ from legal activities in the following related ways. First, disputes in rule
dominated activities are almost entirely over facts. Since everyone shares a common understanding of the strike zone, controversy over pitches is necessarily limited to disagreements over
whether a pitch entered the strike zone at some point. While
some disputes in law are entirely over historical facts, others are
about what rule governs a particular set of facts, whether, for example, the first amendment only prohibits prior restraints on
speech. Second, all disputes in a rule dominated activity are resolvable once the relevant facts are established. When presented
with an accurate slow motion replay of a particular pitch, all
competent umpires should agree on the proper call. Disagreement in these cases merely demonstrates a stubborn refusal to
admit error. When disputes in law are over the substance of
rules, establishing the relevant facts rarely ends the controversy.
Litigants who agree on the content and probable consequences
of a speech may nevertheless debate whether the speech is protected by the constitution. Third, a person officiating a rule
dominated activity need not know anything about how or why
the game is played. An umpire who knew very little about base13.

Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously at 25 (cited in note 1).
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ball could do a professional job calling balls and strikes, as long
as that person had excellent eyesight, memorized the definition
of "strike," and had the courage not to flinch when the ball was
pitched at high speeds. The good judge, however, must be immersed in the social practices of the society in order to determine the proper weight to be given to various legal and constitutional principles.
A. SPORTING RULES AND PRINCIPLES

The law of sports in books and in action belie Dworkin's untutored assertion that games are more rule dominated than constitutional law. High minded principles and technical rules exist
side by side in the official rule books of most games as they do in
legal codes and constitutions. Sports officials in practice apply
provisions that seem to express principles in ways that Dworkin
claims judges should and do apply apparent references to principles in legal codes. Indeed, sports officials often treat text that
apparently expresses a rule in ways that Dworkin would have
judges apply principles.
Rule domination varies by game. Baseball and swimming
are fairly rule-dominated. The provisions governing how various
strokes must be executed, for example, refer to specific placement of the swimmer's hands, feet and chest. "Both arms" of a
swimmer in a butterfly race "must be brought forward over the
water and pulled back simultaneously," and "[a]ll up and down
movements of the legs and feet must be simultaneous. " 14 Such
central terms of baseball as "out" and "run" are also defined in
ways suggesting that their application is a simple matter of laying
the facts down next to the rule. Crucial "laws of soccer," however, use language far more suggestive of principles than rules.
Law 11 states that "[a] player in an offside position is only penalised if ... he [or she] is ... interfering with play or interfering
with an opponent or gaining an advantage by being in that position."15 Law 5 declares that "[t]he referee ... allows play to continue when the team against which an offense has been committed will benefit from such an advantage." 16 No fact specific
definition of "interference" or "advantage" is provided. Many
provisions in the basketball rule book similarly seem to evoke
14. Montgomery County Swim League: Handbook 1998 at 61.
15. Law 11, 1998 edition of the Laws of the Game, (visited July 11, 1999)
<http://www.fifa.com/fifa!handbook!laws/ index.laws.html>.
16. Law 5, Laws of the Games (cited in note 15).
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general principles. The National Basketball Association (NBA)
defines a "flagrant foul" as "unnecessary and/or excessive con17
tact committed by a player against an opponent. " This language echoes Article I, Section 8's declaration that "[t)he Congress shall have the Power ... [t]o make all Laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing
Powers," and the ban on "excessive bail" found in the Eighth
Amendment, both of which Dworkin probably thinks set out legal principles rather than legal rules. The NBA also explicitly
recognizes an "Elastic Power" vesting "[t)he officials" with "the
power to make decisions on any point not specifically covered in
the rules. " 18
The "elastic power" of basketball referees, the "advantage"
provision in the laws of soccer, and other such declarations in the
official laws of various sports do not seem mere shorthand for a
more complex set of fact situations. The same or similar language that Dworkin claims evokes principles in law is often
found in the rules of various games. Would the First Amendment have expressed a legal rule had the framers written, "Congress shall not ... interfere with the freedom of speech"?
Moreover, seeming references to principles in sports in practice
function like principles rather than rules. Experienced referees
dispute whether the advantage rule should be applied in an
uncontested fact situation. Some referees I worked with would
not call offsides unless an attempt was made to pass the ball to a
player in an offsides position; others interpreted "interference"
as requiring offsides to be called whenever a player in an offsides
position was distracting a defender. Officials who knew very little about soccer had great difficulty calling the offsides rule.
Their ability to recite that text from memory did little to dispel
the havoc their poor calls created.
Referees and umpires also engage in interpretive-like behavior when applying what on their face seem to be clear rules.
Good little league and adult softball league umpires frequently
call pitches "strikes" that do not meet the rule book requirements. Most players in adult recreational softball teams want to
swing the bat. By expanding the strike zone in certain situations,
the umpire serves the real point of the game, which is to give
players chances to get relive past athletic glories, real or (more
17. Official Rules of the National Basketball Association 1998-99 at 18 (The Sporting News, 1998).
18. National Basketball Association Rules at 11 (cited in note 17).
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often) imagined. The strike zone is often expanded in youth
games when the umpire believes that following the letter of the
law would result in so many walks that the game would be neither fun nor educational. The strike zone may be a bit wider for
the pitcher who, in an effort to be accurate, is not pitching as fast
as possible than for the pitcher who throws every pitch at maximum speed, not caring where the ball winds up. The strike zone
in both games is thus interpreted in light of the more general
reasons why adults play recreational softball and children play
little league baseball. Persons who do understand the point of
these activities will make poor officials.
Major league umpires also do not engage in mere factfinding when calling balls and strikes. Pitchers and hitters know
that the strike zone in the National League is different than the
strike zone in the American League. 19 The supervisors of officials in both the American and National Le~ue recognize that
" [e]very umpire has their own strike zone," or their own way
to "handle[ ] the strike zone." 21 These different interpretations
of the strike zone reflect different understandings of baseball,
not different understandings of the precise location of those
parts of the body set out in the definition of strike. The interpretable strike zone was particular evident when the broadcasters declared that one of the keys to game four of the World Series was whether the pitcher for the New York Yankees, Andy
Pettitte, would get the outside strike. Agreement existed on the
location of Pettitte's crucial pitch. The question was whether
that pitch would (or should) be called a strike.
Many fans do complain about major league variations in the
strike zone. One frequently hears demands that umpires should
stop relying on personal interpretations of "strike" and just obey
the rules. "[I]t is the duty of an umpire to enforce that [strike]
zone," sports columnist Bill Lyon writes, "not to interpret it to
suit his own particular notion and whim. " 22 Similar complaints
19. See Tom Krasovic, Padres find out firsthand AL strike zone, San Diego UnionTribune (Oct. 18, 1998), available in LEXIS, News Library; Bill Brubaker,ln Postseason,
Calls Are Going Against Umpires; Inconsistent Strike Zone is Among Complaints, Washington Post (Oct. 16, 1998), available in LEXIS, News Library.
20. Brubaker, Washington Post (cited in note 19).
21. Joseph Duarte, Zoned Out; Ball; Strike inconsistency subjects umpires to major
scrutiny, Houston Chronicle (Oct. 20, 1998), available in LEXIS, News Library.
22. Bill Lyon, It's time for the umpires to recognize rule on strike zone, Fort Worth
Star-Telegram (Oct. 12, 1998), available in LEXIS, News Library. See Gerry Callahan,
Moody Blues, 89 Sports Illustrated 43, 44 (Oct. 19, 1998), available in LEXIS, News Library, ("(a]nother cause for frustration is the umpires' belief that the strike zone is theirs
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are made of judges. Lyon could have been paraphrasing Robert
Bork's frequent insistence that "judges must consider themselves
bound bX law that is independent of their own views of the desirable." A central point of Dworkinian theory is that such
complains are invalid, at least to the extent they deny that laws
must be interpreted in light of some more general moral theory.
Taking Rights Seriously never explains why Dworkin's interpretative stance is invalid with respect to the strike zone, but valid
with respect to the First Amendment.
Law professors still sympathetic to Dworkin's account of
sports officiating should grab their National Basketball Association rules and head off to the nearest professional basketball
game. Most rules are not enforced fully. Players take extra
steps in order to make fancy passes or shots; illegal contact takes
place on virtually every rebound. Some rules are enforced differently for the stars than for journeymen players. Michael Jordan may be allowed an extra shove or step that Luc Longley is
quickly penalized for. These deviations from the law in books
are rooted in more basic understandings of how basketball
should be played and officiated. As veteran referee Earl Strom
noted upon retirement, his "philosophy of officiating ... recognizes that pro basketball is bigger than the rule book and ... officials need latitude to interpret the game." The point of refereeing, he declared, is to prevent "unfair advantage," not to call
24
every rule book violation the referee sees.
Indeed, at virtually all levels, from pee-wee ball to the professional or college game, "basketball" is not played by the rules.
Referees ignore conduct that seems clearly to be within the letter of the prohibitions and may even penalize conduct that seems
legal. My first mentor, Rocco Valvano, was fond of saying that a
good referee is a little bit deaf and a little bit blind. Basketball,
he observed, could be played only if the officials did not see everything or hear everything. Just as the surest way to upset a
business is to follow all the rules to the letter, so the surest way
for an official to ruin a game is to follow the rules religiously.
The mark of a good official is not how well he sees the game or
knows the rules, but his knowledge of when to "hear" the profanity mumbled by an angered coach or when to "see" the
to interpret, as if it were an Impressionist painting").
23. Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law 5
(Simon & Schuster Inc., 1990).
24. Earl Strom, How to Call 'Em Like A Pro, 73 Sports Illustrated 124, 125 (Nov. 5,
1990), available in LEXIS, News Library.
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shoving taking place on the high post.
Dworkin would certainly have been disabused of his notion
that games are rule dominated had he ever sat in on one of the
many meetings licensed officials are required to attend. Every
local officiating board has an officer called the "interpreter."
The interpreter of the high school basketball board in New Haven consistently spoke of "our Board's philosophy" (emphasis in
original). Other occupants of that office used similar phrases to
describe a referee's orientation to the rules. The central point of
every meeting was that rules should be enforced so that neither
team could gain an unfair advantage. Far more time was spent
discussing and debating what constituted an unfair advantage
than precise fact situations. Disputes existed between and within
boards over how certain rules should be interpreted. Basketball
officials in Long Island believed that teams gained an unfair advantage whenever an offensive player stayed in the three second
lane for more than three seconds; basketball officials in Connecticut believed that teams gained an unfair advantage only
when that offensive player had the ball or was seeking to gain
the ball. The debates over the merits of strict versus loose construction of the laws of basketball that take place in the bars officials hang out in after games are much the same as the ones in
the law reviews.
Dworkin was unaware of all these aspects of sports officiating when he wrote Taking Rights Seriously. Most games, from
little league baseball to professional basketball, would neither be
as fun nor as recreational if sports officials understood their responsibilities as enforcing rules rather than as preventing teams
from gaining unfair advantages in ways not intended by the laws
of the game. Taking Rights Seriously may have important things
to say about how legal judges ought to make decisions. After
publishing that work, Dworkin was invited to occupy numerous
prestigious legal chairs and give many prestigious legal lectures.
To the best of my knowledge, however, he was never asked to
referee a major league (or even an amateur) sporting event.
II. LAW, SPORTS OFFICIATING AND OTHER
INTERDISCIPLINARY LEGAL STUDIES
The merits of Dworkin's theory of judging do not depend
on his evaluation of sports officiating. Differences between the
purpose of various games and national constitutions may warrant treating similar language as expressing a rule for one en-
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deavor and a principle for the other. Whether "Congress shall
make no law abridging the freedom of the speech" should be interpreted as stating a legal rule or legal principle does not intuitively depend on whether "a player in an offsides position is only
penalized if he or she is interfering with play" should be interpreted as a soccer rule or soccer principle. If the best understanding of the practice of law requires treating certain text as
expressing a general principle, then legal practices should not be
altered merely because the best understanding of some other
practice might justify treating an analogous text as expressing a
rule.
Specific orientations in one enterprise do not entail any specific orientation in the other. Some lawyer/sports officials may
think ambiguous texts or practices should be regarded as expressing rules for games but principles for law. I tried to adhere
to the rule book definition of "strike" because I believed having
all umpires treat the relevant provision as a rule would best ensure that the pitch I called a strike in New Haven on Monday
was also called a strike in Bridgeport on Monday and in New
Haven on Thursday. Supreme Court decisions, however, being
made as a group, will be relatively consistent even if each Justice
interprets ambiguous text as expressing principles, as long as
each Justice applies those principles consistently. Dworkinian
forms of interpretation will mean that the Unit~d States Supreme Court in 1999 may not interpret the constitution in the
way that text was interpreted in 1899 or in the way the Israeli
Supreme Court in 1999 interprets identical text in the Israeli
constitution. These inconsistencies strike me as less damaging to
constitutionalism than inconsistencies from game to game in the
strike zone are to the enterprise of baseball. Nevertheless, another lawyer/sports official might think that the game of baseball
would be fairer and more interesting to spectators if some games
were officiated by hitter's umpires and others by pitcher's umpires, but that rule of law considerations require that the meaning of the Eighth Amendment not vary over time. In short,
theories about how a good umpire should interpret the strike
zone will not help scholars predict or determine how a good Supreme Court Justices should interpret the First Amendment.
Taking Rights Seriously may demonstrate how lawyers
sometimes gain valuable insights into the law even when they
make erroneous comparisons with other professions. A scholar
might develop insights into the ways in which lawyers counsel
clients by comparing legal counseling to psychological counsel-
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ing, even if the scholar's conception of psychological counseling
is wrong. That a scholar who began with a correct model of psychological counseling would develop a better understanding of
legal counseling than a scholar who worked from a faulty psychological model is not entirely clear. Inspired by Persuasion
and Healing, I might write a path breaking essay demonstrating
that much of legal counseling serves to boost morale, a thesis
that might in no way depend on whether Jerome and Julia Frank
are correct when they claim most psychotherapies function by
bolstering morale. 25 For all we know, the inspiration for
Dworkin's extraordinarily influential theory of legal judging may
have been his wildly inaccurate characterization of sports officiating.
Still, Dworkin's foray into law and sports officiating offers
cautionary lessons for law professors thinking about embarking
on a similar expedition into other heavily charted fields. The
most obvious lesson is that persons who write articles having
only a casual acquaintance with their subject-matter are likely to
make claims that are wrong, claims that no suitably certified expert in the field would take seriously. The more subtle lesson is
that lawyers who write on interdisciplinary subjects will miss
those unique features of their non-legal subject that might actually teach them something about the law, if all their work does is
impose legal categories on non-legal subjects.
The probability of error is particularly high when law professors write on non-legal subjects. Their works are usually reviewed only by other law professors or law students. Not only
was Dworkin not a "suitably certified expert" in sports officiating, but a good probability exists that no "suitably certified expert" in sports officiating read Taking Rights Seriously in manuscript, reviewed that book for a press, or subsequently
commented on that work in a scholarly or popular forum. Given
the law review preference for bold theses and the tendency for
other academic disciplines to recognize shades of gray, the quality of the non-legal scholarship in an essay submitted to a law review may have little or even an inverse relationship to the probability of a publication offer.
Law professors without substantial expertise in their interdisciplinary subject are prone to write pieces which resemble the
book report Linus writes in You're a Good Man Charlie Brown,
25. Jerome David Frank and Julia B. Frank, PersutJSion and Healing: A Comparative Study of Psychotherapy (Johns Hopkins U. Press, 3d ed. 1993).
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a report which after a thoughtful analysis of Robin Hood merely
concludes that "Peter Rabbit was like that too." Dworkin assumed that the model of law set out by legal positivists correctly
described what a sports official did, and that the way judges understood legal rules could describe the way other authorities understood the rules of their activities. At no point in Taking
Rights Seriously is there a hint that rules in some activities might
be implemented and enforced in ways not captured by any extant model of legal behavior. As a result, Dworkin's belief that
sports officials largely apply facts to preexisting rules is based on
a failure to perceive fundamental differences in the way legal
and sports norms are applied, differences that might have been
obvious had Dworkin thought more seriously about the context
in which sports norms are enforced.
Justices decide controversies according to law, while sports
officials are better understood as declaring how various laws apply to particular instances. Many differences between legal
judging and sports officiating reflect this difference between adjudicatory and declarative functions. Judges make decisions
only when a legal disagreement exists and at least one party pays
the expenses necessary to bring the controversy to court. If the
parties to a contract agree that each has performed their contractual obligations, the legal system does not get involved. Sports
officials are far more proactive. The umpire declares whether
every pitch is a strike. The umpire must verbally and physically
call a pitch a strike even if every player and every fan agrees that
the pitch was a strike. Indeed, umpires sometimes call pitches
strikes when every player and fan thinks the pitch a ball, a situation which generally does not occur in law. Legal judges would
behave more like sports officials if every time one party to a bargain attempted to perform some contractual duty, a judge was
always in place to rule "performed" or "unperformed." Sports
officials would behave more like legal judges if, instead of
standing behind home plate, the lead umpire had an office on
the other side of town and only settled controversies between
two teams when the aggrieved party was willing to hire a lawyer
to present an appeal.
Consider, for example, if the Paula Jones lawsuit against
President Clinton had been resolved by a sports officiating
model of enforcing laws. First, an official would have been in
the hotel room, thus avoiding most of the evidentiary problems
both sides faced when trying to prove their version of the facts.
Second, the official would have immediately ruled "legal" or
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"harassment," as well as instantly enforcing any penalty should
harassment be found. This would have prevented all the uncertainties the actual Jones litigation caused, and enabled the political game to go on uninterrupted. Finally, and perhaps most important, Paula Jones would not have had to meet a very
expensive "de facto counsel requirement" in order to have her
day in court. 26 Rather, an umpire would always be in place to
penalize any powerful person who sought to take legal advantage of a less powerful individual. Privacy (and expense) no
doubt explain why judges do not hang around on every street
corner (and in every hotel room), but had Dworkin done a serious comparison between legal judging and sports officiating he
might have highlighted some of the costs a society pays for foregoing this more intrusive model of law enforcement.
This more serious study of how the rules of various games
are enforced would also have revealed why sports officials make
more fact decisions than legal judges-Supreme Court Justices,
in particular. Most legal systems farm out controversial factfinding to other legal actors. Appellate judges frequently concentrate on controversies over legal rules because controversies
over fact are expected to be resolved by the trial judge or jury.
Sports officiating does not exhibit this division of labor. Baseball umpires are expected to resolve all controversies that arise
in a game. In this respect, their balance of decisions more reflects that of trial judges in cases without juries than Supreme
Court Justices who frequently sit in cases where the facts are
stipulated.
Dworkin was mistaken when he claimed "[r]ules are applicable in an ali-or-nothing fashion." Police officers do not attempt to resolve every crime. Studies suggest that police officers
do not even pursue half the crimes they personally witness. 27
Prosecutors exhibit similar discretion, either failing to prosecute
offenses or prosecuting a much lesser offense than the facts
might warrant. If appellate judges tend to apply rules in an aUor-nothing fashion, the reason may well be that the legal system
avoids problems that strict enforcement of the rules would bring
by vesting the necessary discretion in non-judicial law enforcers.
26. On the "de facto counsel" requirement, see Susan E. Lawrence, The Poor in
Court: The Legal Services Program and Supreme Court Decision Making (Princeton U.
Press, 1990).
27. See generally Albert J. Reiss, Jr., The Police and the Public (Yale U. Press,
1971); Joseph Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process: LowVisibility Decisions in the Administration of Justice, 69 Yale L.J. 543 (1960).
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Sports officials, by comparison, combine the function of police
officer, prosecutor, witness, jury, and judge, in a system where
there is very little meaningful appeal. A good sports official
must be "a little bit blind and a little bit deaf" for the same reason a good police officer should exhibit those virtues, but perhaps not a good Supreme Court Justice.
The virtue of interdisciplinary studies is closely related to
the virtue of comparative studies. By recognizing how different
societies and enterprises organize various activities, scholars may
gain much needed perspectives on their own societies and activities. Lawyers may learn that the American legal system is not
the only way to enforce laws, better appreciate the reasons why
legal judges behave differently than sports officials, and even
gain insights that may enable legal models to acquire some of the
benefits of the sports officiating approach to rules. None of
these advantages can be realized, however, if interdisciplinary
studies follow the model set out in Taking Rights Seriously and
merely slap legal categories on non-legal subjects.
Ill. REPEATING DWORKIN'S MISTAKES

How pervasive Dworkin-like mistakes are in interdisciplinary legal scholarship is impossible for one person to assess. No
one is a "suitably certified expert" in all the fields that law professors have invaded in recent years. The best I can do in most
cases is report that friends who are suitably certified experts in
various fields are rarely impressed by the quality of legal scholarship that trenches on their area of expertise, and comment a
bit on a recent foray into my purported area of expertise, political science.
In the prestigious "Foreword" to the 1996 Harvard Law
Review, Cass Sunstein distinguishes his approach to judicial review from that previously advocated by Alexander Bickel partly
by asserting that "Bickel's belief in 'prudence' was based on a
generalized fear of political backlash, and not on social scientific
evidence." 28 Citing Gerald Rosenberg's The Hollow Hope, Sunstein proclaims " [w]e now know that it may be counterproductive for the Court to insist on social reform even if the Court is
29
right." Later in the essay, Sunstein cites Rosenberg for the
28. Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 8
n.8 (1996).

29.

Id.
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propositions that "[t]he Court may not produce social reform
even when it seeks to do so," and that the court "may instead activate forces of opposition and demobilize the political actors
that it favors." 30 Law professors may question whether "Bickel's
belief in 'prudence' was based on a generalized fear of political
backlash" or on the political events Bickel personally witnessed
during the 1950s and 1960s.31 Political scientists, on the other
hand, will recognize the extraordinarily primitive characterization of the social science evidence that Sunstein thinks supports
his notion of judicial minimalism.
Sunstein is wrong to think that social science evidence of the
sort Rosenberg presents was not available to Bickel. As Rosenberg acknowledges in his introduction, his model of the Constrained Court is "well-established" both "functional[ly] and historical[ly]."32 To a good degree, The Hollow Hope compares the
traditional social science understanding that the Supreme Court
plays only a limited role in American politics33 with the traditional legal view that the Court can create dramatic legal change,
with traditional social science by and large emerging victorious.
Rosenberg reports that his findings are treated with s~pticism in
law schools, but that the more common response among political
scientists has been "what's new." 34
Sunstein also relies on a substantially over-simplified version of the Rosenberg thesis. Rosenberg does believe that "the
Court may not produce social reform even when it seeks to do
so,"35 but this weak claim standing alone would hardly justify the
importance of The Hollow Hope. Much of the originality of that
work lies in the various conditions Rosenberg claims explain and
predict the (numerous) circumstances when litigation campaigns
do not produce much social change and the (relatively rare) cir-

30. ld. at 33.
31. For discussions of the political backlash to judicial decisions in cases concerning
segregation and the rights of alleged Communists, see Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Raciol
Change, and the Civil Rights Movement, 80 Va. L. Rev. 7 (1994); Walter F. Murphy, Congress and the Coun: A Case Study in the American Political Process (U. of Chicago Press,
1962).

32. Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Sociol
Change? 3 (U. of Chicago Press, 1991).
33. See, e.g., Robert G. McOoskey, The American Supreme Coun (revised by
Sanford Levinson) (U. of Chicago Press, 2d ed. 1994).
34. Gerald N. Rosenberg, Hollow Hopes and Other Aspirations: A Reply to Feeley
and McCann, 17 L. & Soc. Inquiry 761,764, TI6 (1992).
35. See Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope at 336 (cited in note 32) (noting "the mostly
disappointing results of attempts to use the courts to produce significant social reform").
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cumstances when they do. 36 These conditions play no explicit
role in Sunstein's analysis, have little to do with judicial minimalism in general, and often suggest different conclusions in particular cases than those Sunstein reaches. Rosenberg suggests
that judicial decisions may create much social change if they can
be implemented by private market forces. 37 This claim might justify broad judicial decisions protecting commercial advertising,
but Sunstein advocates judicial minimalism in that area of constitutionallaw.38 Sunstein supportsjudicial decisions expanding the
rights of women, even though Rosenberg has a chapter claiming
that such cases have done virtually nothing to improve gender
equality. 39 Sunstein does not support judicial activism in welfare
rights cases, even though some social scientists have found that
judicial decisions J?rotecting the poor have had a significant and
beneficial impact.
Finally, Sunstein betrays no awareness that Rosenberg's
findings are controversial. The Hollow Hope is an extremely
important work within political science, but not the last word.
Some scholars claim that Rosenberg's data are wrong,41 and others claim that litigation campaigns have had positive effects on
social reform that Rosenberg missed. 42 My study of abortion
found that backlash occurred whenever pro-choice forces won
victories in any forum. 43 Hence, contrary to Sunstein's claim,
backlash is not uniquely associated with litigation campaigns.44
Rosenberg has responded to some of these criticisms, and the
36. Id. at 35-36.
37. Id. at 195-201.
38. Sunstein, Leaving Things Undecided at 82-86 (cited in note 29).
39. Compare Sunstein, Leaving Things Undecided at 72-79 (cited in note 29) with
Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope at 202-65 (cited in note 32).
40. Compare Cass R. Sunstein, The Panial Constitution 138-39 (Harvard U. Press,
1993) with Mark A. Graber, The Clinronijication of American Law: Abortion, Welfare,
and Liberal Constitutional Theory, 58 Ohio St. L.J. 731, 787-88 (1997) (citing numerous
empirical studies of the impact of judicial decisions on the poor).
41. Roy B. Flemming, John Bohte, and B. Dan Wood, One Voice Among Many:
The Supreme Coun's Influence on Anenriveness to Issues in the United States, 1947-92, 41
Am. J. of Pol. Sci.1224,1229-30 (1997).
42. Michael W. McCann, Rights at Work: Pay Equity and the Politics of Legal Mobilization (U. of Chicago Press, 1994); R. Shep Melnick, Between the Lines: Interpreting
Welfare Rights (Brookings Institution, 1994); Mark A. Graber, Rethinking Abonion:
Equal Choice, the Constitution, and Reproductive Politics (Princeton U. Press, 1996).
43. Graber, Rethinking Abortion at 125-26 (cited in note 42).
44. Do the backlash elections of 1874 (against Reconstruction), 1938 (against the
New Deal), and 1966 (against the Great Society), indicate that reformers ought to avoid
major legislation or constitutional amendments? Does the failure of the Populist movement demonstrate that progressives should not rely on mass movements to achieve social
change?
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debate goes on.45 The important point is that the influence of judicial review on social reform is contested in political science and
every political scientist knows that. No serious social scientist
would base a theory of the judicial function on The Hollow Hope
without incorporating the conditions of judicial efficacy set out
in that work or without at least acknowledging some of the criticisms that have been made of Rosenberg's claims.
Sunstein has improved upon Dworkin in that he has at least
read, perhaps too superficially, a major work in his non-legal
field. Had "Leaving Things Undecided" simply reminded lawyers that legal victories do not necessarily produce social change,
Sunstein would have correctly stated social science wisdom. Neither The Hollow Hope in particular nor the political science literature on judicial capacity in general, however, provide strong
support for Sunstein's normative agenda. Significantly, conventional wisdom in social science also maintains that social change
is hard to produce by any means, particularly in a society such as
the United States where power is highly fragmented. 46 Witness
the limited success of the War on Poverty, which was largely
fought on non-legal terrains. Unfortunately, rather than engage
seriously with this social science literature on implementation or
judicial capacity, Sunstein pronounced as authoritative one social science work and simplified that work's findings to fit conclusions reached on non-social science grounds. The result, to
47
paraphrase all the relevant phrases, is "usable political science,"
49
48
"law-office political science," or "political-science lite."
IV. RETHINKING "LAW AND X" STUDIES
While the male leads in Gilbert and Sullivan's The Gondoliers originally claimed to be "against kings," they quickly emphasized that they meant to say only that they were "against bad
kings." Similarly, when this essay inveighs against interdisciplinary legal scholarship, I mean only to inveigh against bad inter45. The most recent development in the saga of Rosenberg versus his critics is
David A. Schultz, ed., Leveraging rhe Law: Using rhe Couns ro Achieve Social Change
(Peter Lang, 1998).
46. The classic study here is Jeffrey L. Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky, Implementation: How Grear Expectations in Washington are Dashed in Oakland (U. of California
Press, 1973).
47. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Idea of a Usable Past, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 601 (1995).
48. See Alfred H. Kelly, Clio and rhe Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 Sup. Ct.
Rev. 119, 122.
49. See MartinS. Flaherty, History 'Lire' in Modern American Consrirurionalism, 95
Colum. L. Rev. 523 (1995).
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disciplinary legal scholarship. Significant risks are associated
with interdisciplinary scholarship of any sort, but boundary lines
between disciplines are highly artificial and important questions
will not be asked should all scholars stick too closely to the
norms of their home field.
Still, reason exists for thinking that law professors who do
interdisciplinary legal scholarship are particularly likely to do
bad interdisciplinary legal scholarship. The refereeing process in
law reviews is much less likely than the refereeing process in
other academic journals to catch factual and conceptual mistakes. A law professor who submits an essay on law and anthropology to a law review is likely to have that essay reviewed by
second and third year law students who may know nothing about
anthropology. An anthropologist who submits an essay on law
and anthropology to an anthropology journal is likely to have
that essay reviewed either by other anthropologists recognized
to know something about law or perhaps even by a law professor. More generally, different Ph.D. programs are likely to be
more similar to each other than to J.D. programs. Ph.D. programs that train most of their students to become professors are
likely to teach scholarly norms differently than J.D. programs
that train most of their students to become practitioner/advocates. All things being equal, therefore, a professor
with a Ph.D. in one discipline is more likely than a professor with
a J.D. to be aware of what must be done to meet or approximate
the professional standards of another discipline.
Nevertheless, Levinson and Balkin are right to maintain
that one need not "be an 'expert' in an area in order to have interesting things to say."50 Scholarly articles in one discipline frequently cite scholarship in another as providing important insights. Law professors have made numerous contributions to
many non-legal fields, including Dworkin on political philosophy, David Rabban on the history of free speech,51 and the numerous contributions of the Wisconsin Law School to law and
52
society. Still, as the example of Dworkin on sports officiating
50. Levinson and Balkin, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 1602-03 (cited in note 8).
51. David M. Rabban, Free Speech in its Forgotten Years (Cambridge U. Press,
1997).
52. See, e.g., Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead· Speculations on
the Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. & Soc'y Rev. 95 (1974). Galanter is currently the John
and Rylla Bosshard Professor of Law at the University of Wisconsin Law School. Levinson and Balkin are omitted from this list only because, having done graduate work in
political science and philosophy, respectively, both qualify as "suitably qualified experts"
in many of the non-legal fields in which they have produced important work. See
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and Sunstein on political science suggest, merely being a very
distinguished law professor does not guarantee that one will
"have interesting things to say" about non-legal matters, except
in the important sense that many people are interested in anything certain celebrity academics say. The important question
for serious interdisciplinary scholarship is how much expertise
one needs "in order to have interesting things to say."
Martin Flaherty suggests one standard when he insists that
if for understandable reasons law professors cannot do original
research in their chosen non-legal field, they should at least be
"reading one or two dozen of the acknowledged leading books"
or articles on their subject matter.53 Certainly Dworkin would
have benefitted from better grounding in sports officiating and
Sunstein from a fuller appreciation of the political science literature on judicial capacity and implementation. Still, the Flaherty
standard needs supplementing. The best test of whether a person has "interesting things to say" on an academic subject is
whether many experts on that subject agree that what is being
said is interesting. Law professors contemplating serious interdisciplinary scholarship should take the steps necessary to begin
a real engagement with leading members of the non-legal discipline. The American Political Science Association provides
many conferences, journals and other sites for law professors to
discover whether they have interesting things to say about political science. Other disciplines provide similar fora that are almost always open to academic lawyers. Those scholars who
have actively participated in these fora have produced important
interdisciplinary work. Law professors who do not usually write
nonsense.
Ronald Dworkin's work on sports officiating and the law
demonstrates the need for a greater cross-fertilization between
persons doing interdisciplinary studies than has been the case.
Instead of inviting members of other fields to write for law reviews, law professors should consider first submitting their interdisciplinary work to journals in the other fields. Even if the
work is rejected and eventually published in a law review, the
comments will help law professors learn whether they have a sufficient understanding of the field to make their comments academically interesting. Those of us in non-legal fields should take
Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Faith (Princeton U. Press, 1988); J.M. Balkin, Cultural
Software: A Theory of Ideology (Yale U. Press, 1998).
53. MartinS. Flaherty, The Practice of Faith, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1565, 1575 (1997).
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advantage of invitations to publish in law reviews. While most
non-legal academics have grave reservations about the quality of
scholarship in law reviews, the blind review process also has
flaws that may discourage bolder scholarship in favor of accurate
descriptions of the insignificant. All participants to debates over
legal matters will benefit from varying the types of journals they
write for. Following the model established by Law & Social Inquiry and the Law & Society Review, constitutional theorists
might consider organizing or reorganizing a journal for academic
lawyers and scholars in other fields who take the concerns of the
others seriously. Articles might be reviewed for accuracy and
originality by both lawyers and non-lawyers. As the true founder of the "law and sports officiating movement," I would be
called upon to validate any sports metaphor that a casual fan attempted to slip into serious constitutional theory.

